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Abstract
In this paper, new two-user multiple access wiretap channel models are studied. First, the multiple
access wiretap channel II with a discrete memoryless main channel, under three different wiretapping
scenarios, is introduced. The wiretapper, as in the classical wiretap channel II model, chooses a fixed-
length subset of the channel uses on which she obtains noise-free observations of one of the codewords,
a superposition of the two codewords, or each of the two codewords. These thus extend the recently
examined wiretap channel II with a noisy main channel to a multiple access setting with a variety of
attack models for the wiretapper. Next, a new multiple access wiretap channel model, which further
generalizes the multiple access wiretap channel II under the third wiretapping scenario, i.e., that which
features the strongest adversarial model, is proposed. In this model, the wiretapper, besides choosing
a subset of the channel uses to noiselessly observe the transmitted codeword symbols of both users,
observes the remainder of the two codewords through a discrete memoryless multiple access channel.
Achievable strong secrecy rate regions for all the proposed models are derived. Achievability is estab-
lished by solving dual multi-terminal secret key agreement problems in the source model, and converting
the solution to the original channel models using probability distribution approximation arguments.
The derived achievable rate regions quantify the secrecy cost due to the additional capabilities of the
wiretapper with respect to the previous multiple access wiretap models.
This work was supported in part by NSF Grant CNS 13-14719. This paper was presented in part at the 2016 IEEE International
Symposium on Information Theory [1] and the 2016 IEEE Information Theory Workshop [2].
2I. INTRODUCTION
The wiretap channel II, in which the legitimate terminals communicate over a noiseless channel
while the wiretapper has perfect access to a fixed fraction of her choosing of the transmitted bits,
was introduced in [3]. This model, while similar to a classical wiretap channel [4] with a noiseless
main channel and a binary erasure channel to the wiretapper, models a more capable wiretapper
who is able to select the positions of erasures. Using random partitioning and combinatorial
arguments, [3] has shown that the secrecy capacity of the wiretap channel II model does not
decrease if the wiretapper is a passive observer with a binary erasure channel whose erasures
are randomly chosen by nature, demonstrating the immunity of wiretap coding against a more
capable adversary who is able to choose the erasure positions.
Considerable amount of research on practical code design for secrecy has been motivated by
the coset coding scheme devised in [3], see for example [5]–[9]. However, for several decades,
there has been no effort for generalizing the wiretap II model outside the special scenario of the
noiseless main channel. Recently, [10] has introduced a discrete memoryless main channel to
the wiretap channel II model, and derived inner and outer bounds for its capacity-equivocation
region. Reference [11] has characterized the secrecy capacity of this model, showing that, once
again, the secrecy capacity of the model does not decrease when the more capable wiretapper
is replaced with an erasure channel.
More recently, [12] has introduced the generalized wiretap channel and identified its secrecy
capacity. In this model, the main channel is a discrete memoryless channel while the wiretapper,
besides noiselessly observing a subset of the transmitted codeword symbols of her choice,
observes the remainder through a discrete memoryless channel. This new model subsumes both
the classical wiretap channel [13] and the wiretap channel II with a discrete memoryless main
channel [10] as its special cases. The secrecy capacity of this generalized model quantifies the
secrecy penalty of the additional capability at the wiretapper with respect to the previous wiretap
models. Investigating the multi-terminal extensions of this new wiretap model is the natural next
step, much like what happened with Wyner’s wiretap channel, see for example [14]–[20],
In this paper, we thus extend this new wiretap channel model to the multiple access scenario
[16]. In particular, we first consider the special case of the multiple access wiretap channel II
with a discrete memoryless main channel, and propose three different attack models for the
3wiretapper. In each of these models, the wiretapper chooses a fixed-length subset of the channel
uses and observes erasures outside this subset. In the first wiretapping model, the wiretapper, in
each position of the subset, decides to observe either the first or the second user’s symbol. In the
second model, the wiretapper observes a noiseless superposition of the two transmitted symbols
in the positions of the subset, while in the third model, the wiretapper observes the transmitted
symbols of both users.
The first attack model is a setting in which the wiretapper is able to tap one of the two
transmissions but not both. For instance, if two transmitters are distant from each other, the
wiretapper may need get close to one in order to obtain noise-free observations, and thus is
able to tap one at a time. The second attack model mimics a medium that superposes both
transmissions (e.g., wireless), where the attacker is close enough to both transmitters. In the
third attack model, the wiretapper is able to tap both codewords individually, which can be
interpreted as the wiretapper being able to obtain noiseless (partial) side information about both
transmitted codewords.
For each of these models, we derive an achievable strong secrecy rate region. Even though
the third attack model, in which the wiretapper sees the transmitted symbols of both users, is
stronger than the first, the ability of the wiretapper in the first model to choose which user’s
symbol to tap into results in identical achievable strong secrecy rate regions for the two models.
That is, each transmitter designs their encoding according to the worst case scenario in which the
wiretapper chooses to see his symbols in all positions of the subset. The achievable secrecy rate
region for the second attack model is shown to be larger than the achievable secrecy rate region
for the other two models, demonstrating the intrinsic cooperation introduced by superposition.
After obtaining these insights, we generalize these models by replacing the wiretapper’s
erasures with noisy channel outputs as was done in [12] for the single user channel. In particular,
we generalize the multiple access wiretap channel II with a discrete memoryless main channel,
under the third wiretapping scenario, i.e., the strongest attack model, to the case when the
wiretapper observes the remainder of the codewords of both users separately through a discrete
memoryless channel. This model also generalizes the multiple access wiretap channel in [15] to
the case when the wiretapper is provided with a subset of noiseless observations of her choice for
the transmitted symbols of both users. An achievable strong secrecy rate region, which quantifies
4the secrecy cost of the additional capability of the wiretapper in this model with respect to the
multiple access wiretap channel in [15], [21], is derived.
Achievability of the strong secrecy rate regions for all the proposed models is established by
muti-terminal extensions of methods in [12], [22], [23]. In particular, for each of the proposed
models, a corresponding dual multi-terminal secret key agreement problem in the source model
is introduced. In this dual model, two independent sources wish to agree on two indepedent
keys with a common decoder in the presence of a compound wiretapping source. We solve the
problem in the dual source model, and convert the solution to the original channel model by
means of deriving the joint distributions of the two problems to become almost identical, in the
total variation distance sense. The technical challenge in the present paper lies in generalizing
the tool utilized for establishing secrecy of the key in the dual source model from the single
source case, [12, Lemma 2], to the case of two independent sources. This is done by adapting the
lemma in order to establish all the corner (extreme) points of the rate region for the two keys,
generated at the independent sources, such that the convergence rate for the probability of the two
keys being independent from the wiretapper’s observation is doubly-exponential. Time sharing
between the resulting corner points produces the desired rate region. This doubly-exponential
convergence rate is needed in order to exhaust the exponentially many possible strategies for the
wiretapper [11], [12].
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section II describes the channel models
considered in this paper. Section III presents the main results. The proofs of the results are
presented in Sections IV and V. Section VI concludes the paper.
II. CHANNEL MODELS
We first remark the notation we use throughout the paper. Vectors are denoted by bold lower-
case superscripted letters while their components are denoted by lower-case subscripted letters. A
similar convention but with upper-case letters is used for random vectors and their components.
Vector superscripts are omitted when the dimensions are clear from the context. A1×A2 denotes
the Cartesian product of the sets A1,A2. For random variables (vectors) and their components,
we use A[i:j] to denote {Ai, · · · , Aj}, where i, j ∈ N, i < j. We also use AS , {Ai}i∈S for
S ⊆ N. We use 1{A} to denote the indicator function of the event A. For a, b ∈ R, [a : b]
5Fig. 1: The two-user multiple access wiretap channel II with a noisy main channel.
denotes the set of integers {i ∈ N : a ≤ i ≤ b}. We use upper-case letters to denote random1
probability distributions, e.g., PX . We use p
U
X to denote a uniform distribution over the random
variable X . The argument of the probability distribution is omitted when it is clear from its
subscript. V(pX , qX) and D(pX ||qX) denote the total variation distance and the Kullback-Leibler
(K-L) divergence between the two probability distributions pX and qX .
Next, we describe the channel models we consider in this paper. In Section II-A, we present
the multiple access wiretap channel II with a noisy main channel under the three aforementioned
attack models for the wiretapper. Section II-B describes a new multiple access wiretap channel
model that generalizes the strongest attack model in Section II-A.
A. The Multiple Access Wiretap Channel II with a Noisy Main Channel
Consider the channel model in Fig. 1. The main channel {X1,X2,Y, pY |X1X2} is a discrete
memoryless channel consisting of two finite input alphabets X1 and X2, a finite output alphabet Y,
and a transition probability distribution pY |X1X2 . Each transmitter wishes to reliably communicate
an independent message to a common receiver and to keep it secret from the wiretapper. To do
so, transmitter j maps its message, Wj , uniformly distributed over [1 : 2
nRj ], into the transmitted
codeword Xnj = [Xj,1, Xj,2, · · · , Xj,n] ∈ X
n
j using a stochastic encoder, j = 1, 2. The receiver
observes the sequence Yn = [Y1, Y2, · · · , Yn] ∈ Y
n and outputs the estimates Wˆj , j = 1, 2, of
1Random probability distribution PX describes a mapping from the random experiment to the simplex of probability
distributions over X .
6the transmitted messages. As shown in Fig. 1, we consider the following three models for the
wiretapper channel.
1) Model 1: This model is described in Fig. 1, when the switch is on position 1. The wiretapper
chooses the subset Sp ∈ Sp and the sequence u = [u1, u2, · · · , uµ] ∈ {1, 2}
µ, where Sp , {Sp ⊆
[1 : n] : |Sp| = µ ≤ n}. That is, Sp represents the set of positions noiselessly tapped by the
wiretapper and u represents her sequence of decisions to observe either the first or the second
user codeword symbols. We define the fraction of the tapped symbols by the wiretapper as
α =
µ
n
, 0 ≤ α ≤ 1. (1)
Let Sp(k) and u(k) denote the kth elements of the subset Sp and the sequence u, where k =
1, 2, · · · , µ. Let S be the set of all possible strategies for the wiretapper, where S is defined as
S , {(Sp(k),u(k)) : Sp ∈ Sp, u ∈ {1, 2}
µ, k = 1, 2, · · · , µ} . (2)
For S ∈ S, the wiretapper observes ZnS = [ZS,1, ZS,2, · · · , ZS,n] ∈ Z
n, where
ZS,i =


Xj,i, (i, j) ∈ S
?, (i, j) /∈ S,
(3)
and the alphabet Z , {X1 ∪ X2} ∪ {?}.
2) Model 2: The model is described in Fig. 1, when the switch is on position 2. The wiretapper
chooses the subset S ∈ S, where we redfine the set S as
S , {S ⊆ [1 : n] : |S| = µ ≤ n} . (4)
The wiretapper then observes ZnS = [ZS,1, ZS,2, · · · , ZS,n] ∈ Z
n, where
ZS,i =


X1,i +X2,i, i ∈ S
?, , i /∈ S,
(5)
and Z , {X1 + X2} ∪ {?}. That is, the wiretapper observes noiseless superposition of the two
users codeword symbols in the positions of the subset S, and erasures otherwise. The ratio α is
defined as in (1). Note that in the definition of the set Z, we consider natural addition over the
7Fig. 2: The generalized two-user multiple access wiretap channel.
alphabets X1 and X2, i.e., X1 + X2 , {x1 + x2 : x1 ∈ X1, x2 ∈ X2}.
3) Model 3: The model is described in Fig. 1, when the switch is on position 3. The wiretapper
chooses the subset S ∈ S, with S defined as in (4), and observes ZnS = [ZS,1, ZS,2, · · · , ZS,n] ∈
Zn, where
ZS,i =


{X1,i, X2,i}, i ∈ S
?, , i /∈ S,
(6)
and Z , {X1 × X2} ∪ {?}. That is, the wiretapper observes the transmitted codeword symbols
of both users in the positions of the subset S, and erasures otherwise.
Next, we present a generalized multiple access wiretap channel model which extends the
strongest attack model in Section II-A3 to the case when the wiretapper sees noisy observations,
instead of erasures, outside the subset she chooses.
B. The Generalized Multiple Access Wiretap Channel
Consider the channel model in Fig. 2. The main channel in this model is identical to the main
channel in Section II-A. The wiretapper however chooses the subset S ∈ S, with S defined as
in (4), and observes ZnS = [ZS,1, ZS,2, · · · , ZS,n] ∈ Z
n, where
ZS,i =


{X1,i, X2,i}, i ∈ S
Vi, i /∈ S.
(7)
Vn = [V1, V2, · · · , Vn] ∈ V
n is the n-letter output of the discrete memoryless multiple access
channel pV |X1X2 , V is a finite alphabet, and Z , {X1 × X2} ∪ V.
8For the channel models described in Sections II-A and II-B, an (n, 2nR1, 2nR2) channel code
Cn , {C1,n,C2,n} consists of two message sets W1 = [1 : 2
nR1 ], W2 = [1 : 2
nR2 ]; two stochastic
encoders PXn1 |W1,C1,n , PXn2 |W2,C2,n , and a decoder at the receiver. (R1, R2) is an achievable strong
secrecy rate pair if there exists a sequence of (n, 2nR1, 2nR2) codes, {Cn}n≥1, such that
lim
n→∞
P
( ⋃
j=1,2
(Wˆj 6= Wj)
∣∣Cn
)
= 0, (8)
and lim
n→∞
max
S∈S
I(W1,W2;Z
n
S|Cn) = 0. (9)
Strong secrecy capacity region for the channel is the supremum of all achievable strong secrecy
rate pairs (R1, R2). In the following section, we describe the main results of this paper.
III. MAIN RESULTS
We first present achievable strong secrecy rate regions for the two-user multiple access wiretap
channel II with a discrete memoryless main channel, under the attack models for the wiretapper
described in Sections II-A1 and II-A2.
Theorem 1 For 0 ≤ α ≤ 1, an achievable strong secrecy rate region for the multiple access
wiretap channel II in Fig. 1 under the wiretapper model 1, R(1)(α), is given by the convex hull
of all rate pairs (R1, R2) satisfying
R1 ≤ I(U1; Y |U2)− αI(U1;X1), (10)
R2 ≤ I(U2; Y |U1)− αI(U2;X2), (11)
R1 +R2 ≤ I(U1, U2; Y )− αI(U1, U2;X1, X2), (12)
for some distribution pU1X1pU2X2 which satisfies the Markov chains U1−X1−Y and U2−X2−Y .
Remark 1 The achievable strong secrecy rate region for the wiretapper model 1 in Theorem 1
is identical to the achievable region for the more capable wiretapper in model 3, see Corollary
1. When the wiretapper has the ability of choosing to observe either symbol in every tapped
position, each user ought to design their transmission according to the worst case scenario in
which the wiretapper decides to observe only his symbols in all the positions she taps. This
results in an achievable rate region for the wiretapper model 1 as when the wiretapper observes
both users symbols in each position she taps.
9Theorem 2 For 0 ≤ α ≤ 1, an achievable strong secrecy rate region for the multiple access
wiretap channel II in Fig. 1 under the wiretapper model 2, R(2)(α), is given by the convex hull
of all rate pairs (R1, R2) satisfying
R1 ≤ I(U1; Y |U2)− αI(U1;X1 +X2), (13)
R2 ≤ I(U2; Y |U1)− αI(U2;X1 +X2), (14)
R1 +R2 ≤ I(U1, U2; Y )− αI(U1, U2;X1 +X2), (15)
for some distribution pU1X1pU2X2 which satisfies the Markov chains U1−X1−Y and U2−X2−Y .
Remark 2 The achievable strong secrecy rate region for the wiretapper models 1 and 3 is
included in the achievable region for the wiretapper model 2, i.e., R(1)(α) ⊆ R(2)(α). This
follows due to the Markov chains U1 −X1− (X1 +X2); U2−X2− (X1 +X2), and (U1, U2)−
(X1, X2)− (X1 +X2). By data processing inequality, we have
I(Uj;Xj) ≥ I(Uj ;X1 +X2), j = 1, 2, (16)
I(U1, U2;X1, X2) ≥ I(U1, U2;X1 +X2). (17)
Next, we present achievable strong secrecy rate regions for the generalized multiple access
wiretap channel in Fig. 2.
Theorem 3 For 0 ≤ α ≤ 1, an achievable strong secrecy rate region for the generalized multiple
access wiretap channel in Fig. 2, R(α), is given by the convex hull of all rate pairs (R1, R2)
satisfying
R1 ≤ I(U1; Y |U2)− I(U1;V )− αI(U1;X1|V ), (18)
R2 ≤ I(U2; Y |U1)− I(U2;V )− αI(U2;X2|V ), (19)
R1 +R2 ≤ I(U1, U2; Y )− I(U1, U2;V )− αI(U1, U2;X1, X2|V ), (20)
for some distribution pU1X1pU2X2 which satisfies the Markov chains U1 − X1 − (Y, V ) and
U2 −X2 − (Y, V ).
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Corollary 1 For 0 ≤ α ≤ 1, an achievable strong secrecy rate region for the multiple access
wiretap channel II in Section II-A3, i.e., in Fig. 1 under the wiretapper model 3, R(3)(α), is
given by the convex hull of all rate pairs (R1, R2) satisfying
R1 ≤ I(U1; Y |U2)− αI(U1;X1), (21)
R2 ≤ I(U2; Y |U1)− αI(U2;X2), (22)
R1 +R2 ≤ I(U1, U2; Y )− αI(U1, U2;X1, X2), (23)
for some distribution pU1X1pU2X2 which satisfies the Markov chains U1−X1−Y and U2−X2−Y .
Corollary 1 follows directly from Theorem 3 by setting V = const., i.e., the channel pV |X1X2
is an erasure channel with erasure probability one. The proofs for Theorems 1, 2, and 3, are
provided in Sections IV and V.
Remark 3 By setting the size of the subset S to zero, i.e., α = 0, in Theorem 3, we obtain
the achievable strong secrecy rate region in [21, Theorem 1] for the two user multiple access
wiretap channel. The same region was derived under a weak secrecy criterion in [16], [24].
IV. PROOF FOR THEOREM 1
The achievability proof for Theorem 1 follows the same key steps as in [12], with the need
of extending the technique to address the multi-terminal setting as will be explained shortly.
In particular, we first assume the availability of common randomness at all terminals of the
original channel model. We then define a dual multi-terminal secret key agreement problem in
the source model, which introduces a set of random variables similar to those introduced by
the original problem with the assumed common randomness. We then solve for rate conditions
which result in the induced joint distributions from the two models to be almost identical in the
total variation distance sense. We also provide rate conditions which satisfy certain reliability
and secrecy (independence) conditions in the source model. Next, we use the closeness of the
induced joint distributions to show that, under the same rate conditions, the desired reliability and
secrecy properties in the original channel model are satisfied. Finally, we eliminate the common
randomness from the channel model by conditioning on a certain instance of that randomness.
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The outline of achievability is hence threefold: (i) Reliability of the keys in the dual source
model, (ii) Security of the keys in the dual source model, and (iii) Closeness of the induced
joint distributions. Reliability of the keys follows from Slepian-Wolf source coding theorem
for multiple sources [25, Theorem 10.3]. Closeness of joint distributions, and converting the
reliability and security conditions from the dual model to the original problem, are ensured by
deriving an exponential convergence rate for the average total variation distance between the
two distributions. This is done using a rather straightforward generalization of [12, Lemma 1].
The main challenge in the proof lies in ensuring security for the keys in the dual source model,
which requires doubly-exponential convergence rate for the probability of the two keys being
uniform and independent from the wiretapper’s observation, in the Kullback-Leibler divergence
sense. The double-exponential convergence is needed in order to ensure security against the
exponentially many possible strategies for the wiretapper. This is established by adapting the
lemma derived for the single source case in [12] so that we derive the corner points of the
rate region, for the two keys, that satisfies the doubly-exponential convergence. Time sharing
between these corner points hence results in the desired rate region.
Let us first fix the distribution pU1X1pU2X2 = pU1pU2pX1|U1pX2|U2 . Let pY |U1U2 be the distribu-
tion resulting from concatenating the discrete memoryless channels pY |X1X2 and pX1X2|U1U2 =
pX1|U1pX2|U2 , where pY |X1X2 is the main channel transition probability distribution for the model
in Section II-A. That is,
pY |U1U2(y|u1, u2) =
∑
x1,x2∈X1×X2
pX1|U1(x1|u1) pX2|U2(x2|u2) pY |X1X2(y|x1, x2). (24)
We describe the following two protocols, each of which introduces a set of random variables
and induces a joint distribution over them. We precisely identify the joint distribution induced
by each protocol.
Protocol A: This protocol describes a multi-terminal secret key agreement problem in the
source model as shown in Fig. 3. Let Un1 ,U
n
2 ,Y
n be independent and identically distributed
(i.i.d.) sequences according to the distribution pU1pU2pY |U1U2 . Source encoder j observes the
sequence Uj , j = 1, 2. The sequence Uj is randomly and independently binned into the two
indices Wj = B
(j)
1 (Xj) and Fj = B
(j)
2 (Xj), where B
(j)
1 and B
(j)
2 are independent and uniformly
distributed over [1 : 2nRj ] and [1 : 2nR˜j ], respectively. The bins Fj, j = 1, 2, represent the
12
Fig. 3: Protocol A: Multi-terminal secret key agreement problem in the source model.
public messages transmitted noiselessly to the common decoder and perfectly accessed by the
wiretapper. The bins Wj, j = 1, 2, represent the independent confidential keys generated at the
two encoders. The decoder observes the i.i.d. sequence Y and the public messages F1, F2, and
outputs the estimates Uˆ1, Uˆ2, Wˆ1, Wˆ2.
Let S and ZS , for all S ∈ S, be defined as in (2) and (3). The wiretapper chooses the strategy
S ∈ S whose realization is unknown to the legitimate terminals. The wiretapper can thus be
represented by the source ZS , {Z, pZS , S ∈ S} whose distribution is only known to belong to
the finite class {pZS}S∈S; the cardinality of the set S of all possible wiretapper’s strategies for
the attack model 1 is upper bounded as
|S| =
(
n
µ
)
× 2µ =
(
n
αn
)
× 2αn < 2n × 2αn = 2(1+α)n. (25)
Protocol A hence introduces the random variables W[1:2], F[1:2],U[1:2],Y,ZS, Uˆ[1:2], Wˆ[1:2]. The
induced distribution over these variables is given by
P˜W[1:2]F[1:2]U[1:2]YZSUˆ[1:2] = pU[1:2]YZS P˜W[1:2]F[1:2]|U[1:2]P˜Uˆ[1:2]|YF[1:2] (26)
= pU[1:2]YZS P˜Uˆ[1:2]|YF[1:2]1
{
B
(j)
1 (Uj) = Wj,B
(j)
2 (Uj) = Fj , ∀j = 1, 2
}
(27)
= P˜W[1:2]F[1:2]P˜U[1:2]|W[1:2]F[1:2] pYZS |U[1:2]P˜Uˆ[1:2]|YF[1:2]. (28)
Protocol B: This protocol is described as the original channel model in Section II-A1, with
assuming the availability of common randomness F1, F2, at all terminals. F1 and F2 are inde-
pendent, uniformly distributed over [1 : 2nR˜1 ] and [1 : 2nR˜2 ], and independent from all other
random variables. We utilize here the encoders and decoder in (28). That is,
PU[1:2]|W[1:2]F[1:2] = P˜U[1:2]|W[1:2]F[1:2], and PUˆ[1:2]|YF[1:2] = P˜Uˆ[1:2]|YF[1:2]. (29)
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The induced joint distribution for protocol B is thus given by
PW[1:2]F[1:2]U[1:2]YZSUˆ[1:2] = p
U
W[1:2]
pUF[1:2]P˜U[1:2]|W[1:2]F[1:2]pYZS |U[1:2]P˜Uˆ[1:2]|YF[1:2]. (30)
Remark 4 We have ignored the Wˆ variables from the joint distributions in (28) and (30) at this
stage, as we will introduce them later as deterministic functions of the Uˆ random vectors, after
fixing the binning functions.
Remark 5 Notice that P˜U[1:2]|W[1:2]F[1:2] factorizes as P˜U1|W1F1P˜U2|W2F2 . That is, the common
randomness Fi available at the jth transmitter, i, j = 1, 2, i 6= j, is not utilized to generate Uj .
The common randomness Fi, i = 1, 2, represents the realization of transmitter i’s codebook,
which is known at all terminals. However, the transmitted codeword at one transmitter does not
depend on the codebook of the other transmitter.
Remark 6 The induced joint distributions from the two protocols in (28) and (30) are random
due to the random binning of Un1 and U
n
2 .
Before continuing with the proof, we state the following lemmas.
A. Useful Lemmas
By comparing the joint distributions for protocols A and B in (28) and (30), we find that they
only differ in the distribution for W[1:2] and F[1:2]. In particular, W[1:2] and F[1:2] are independent
and uniformly distributed in protocol B, while their distribution in protocol A is determined by
the random binning of U1 and U2. The following lemma is a one-shot result which provides
conditions on the binning rates such that the random binning of U1 and U2 described in
protocol A results in a distribution for the bins that is close, in the total variation distance sense,
to independent uniform distributions. The convergence rate provided by the lemma, which is
exponential, is needed for converting the secrecy (independence) condition, established for the
source model in protocol A, to the original channel model in protocol B.
Lemma 1 Let X1 , {X1, pX1} and X2 , {X2, pX2} be two independent sources. The source
Xj, j = 1, 2, is randomly binned into the two indices Wj = B
(j)
1 (Xj) and Fj = B
(j)
2 (Xj),
14
where B
(j)
1 and B
(j)
2 are independent and uniformly distributed over [1 : W˜j ] and [1 : F˜j ]. Let
B ,
{
B
(j)
1 (xj),B
(j)
2 (xj) : xj ∈ Xj , j = 1, 2
}
, and for γj > 0, j = 1, 2, define
Dγj ,
{
xj ∈ Xj : log
1
pXj (xj)
> γj
}
. (31)
Then, we have
EB
(
V
(
PW[1:2]F[1:2], p
U
W[1:2]
pUF[1:2]
))
≤
2∑
j=1
(
PPXj
(
Xj /∈ Dγj
)
+
1
2
√
W˜jF˜j2−γj
)
, (32)
where P is the induced distribution over W[1:2] and F[1:2].
Proof: Lemma 1 is a generalization of [12, Lemma 1]. In particular, using the triangle inequality,
V
(
PW[1:2]F[1:2], p
U
W[1:2]
pUF[1:2]
)
= V
(
PW1F1PW2F2, p
U
W[1:2]
pUF[1:2]
)
(33)
≤ V
(
PW1F1PW2F2 , p
U
W1
pUF1PW2F2
)
+ V
(
pUW1p
U
F1
PW2F2 , p
U
W[1:2]
pUF[1:2]
)
(34)
=
∑
j=1,2
V
(
PWjFj , p
U
Wj
pUFj
)
, (35)
where (33) follows since X1 and X2 are independent, and hence {W1, F1} and {W2, F2} are
independent as well. Using [12, Lemma 1], we have, for j = 1, 2,
EB
(
V
(
PWjFj , p
U
Wj
pUFj
))
≤ PPXj
(
Xj /∈ Dγj
)
+
1
2
√
W˜jF˜j2−γj , (36)
which completes the proof for Lemma 1. 
Lemma 2 below is again a one-shot result which provides rate conditions for a certain
secrecy (independence) condition in the source model. In particular, the lemma provides a
doubly-exponential convergence rate for the probability of the confidential keys W[1:2] and the
public messages F[1:2] being independent, uniformly distributed, and all independent from the
wiretapper’s observation ZS . This doubly-exponential convergence is utilized, along with the
union bound, to guarantee secrecy against the exponentially many choices for the wiretapper.
Lemma 2 Let X1 , {X1, pX1} and X2 , {X2, pX2} be two sources, both are correlated with
the source {ZS} , {Z, pZS} , S ∈ S. The alphabets X1,X2,Z, and S, are finite. For j = 1, 2,
the source Xj is randomly binned into the two indices Wj and Fj as in Lemma 1. For γj , γij >
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0, i, j = 1, 2, i 6= j, and for any S ∈ S, define
DSj ,
{
(x[1:2], z) ∈ X1 × X2 × Z : (xj , z) ∈ D
S
γj
, (x[1:2], z) ∈ D
S
γij
}
, (37)
where DSγj ,
{
(xj , z) ∈ Xj × Z : log
1
pXj |ZS(xj |z)
> γj
}
, (38)
and DSγij ,
{
(x[1:2], z) ∈ X1 × X2 × Z : log
1
pXi|XjZS(xi|xj , z)
> γij
}
. (39)
If there exists a δ ∈ (0, 1
2
) such that for j = 1, 2, and for all S ∈ S, we have
PpX[1:2]ZS
(
(X[1:2], ZS) ∈ D
S
j
)
≥ 1− δ2, (40)
then, we have, for every ǫ ∈ [0, 1], that
PB
(
max
S∈S
D(PW[1:2]F[1:2]ZS ||p
U
W[1:2]
pUF[1:2]pZS) ≥ 2ǫ˜
)
≤ |S||Z| min
i,j=1,2,i 6=j
{
exp
((
−ǫ2(1− δ)2γj
3W˜jF˜j
))
+ exp
((
−ǫ2(1− δ)2γij
3W˜iF˜i
))}
, (41)
where P is the induced distribution over W[1:2] and F[1:2],
ǫ˜ = max
j=1,2
{
ǫ+ (δ + δ2) log(W˜jF˜j) +Hb(δ
2)
}
, (42)
and Hb is the binary entropy function.
Proof: See the Appendix. 
Remark 7 In applying Lemmas 1 and 2 to the source model in protocol A, we utilize the
version of Hoeffding’s inequality in [26, Theorem 2], [12, Lemma 3]. In addition, after showing
that the reliability and secrecy properties established for the source model hold as well for the
channel model in protocol B, we utilize the selection lemma, [27, Lemma 2.2], in order to prove
the existence of a binning realization such that both properties are still satisfied for the channel
model. It is also utilized to eliminate the common randomness F[1:2] from the channel model.
B. Proof
We first apply Lemma 1 to the source model in protocol A to establish the closeness of the
induced joint distributions from the two protocols. In Lemma 1, set Xj = Uj , W˜j = 2
nRj , and
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F˜j = 2
nR˜j , for j = 1, 2; Uj, W˜j , F˜j are defined as in protocol A. Let Dγj be defined as in (31)
with Xj = Uj for j = 1, 2. For ǫj > 0, j = 1, 2, choose γj = n(1 − ǫj)H(Uj). Without loss of
generality, assume that for all uj , j = 1, 2, pUj (uj) > 0. Using Hoeffding’s inequality, we have
PpUj
(
Uj /∈ Dγj
)
= P
(
log
1
pUj (Uj)
≤ γj
)
(43)
= P
(
n∑
k=1
log
1
pUj (Uj,k)
≤ n(1− ǫj)H(Uj)
)
≤ exp(−βjn), (44)
where βj > 0. By substituting the choices for W˜j , F˜j, γj, and (44) in (32), as long as
R1 + R˜1 < (1− ǫ1)H(U1) (45)
R2 + R˜2 < (1− ǫ2)H(U2), (46)
there exists a β > 0 such that
EB
(
V
(
P˜W[1:2]F[1:2], p
U
W[1:2]
pUF[1:2]
))
≤ 4 exp(−βn). (47)
Using (28), (30), and (47), we have
EB
(
V
(
P˜W[1:2]F[1:2]U[1:2]YZSUˆ[1:2] , PW[1:2]F[1:2]U[1:2]YZSUˆ[1:2]
))
= EB
(
V
(
P˜W[1:2]F[1:2], p
U
W[1:2]
pUF[1:2]
))
≤ 4 exp(−βn). (48)
Next, we establish a reliability condition for the source model in protocol A. We utilize a
Slepian-Wolf decoder [28], which implies that [25, Theorem 10.3]
lim
n→∞
EB
(
PP˜ (Uˆ[1:2] 6= U[1:2])
)
= 0, (49)
as long as
R˜1 ≥ H(U1|U2, Y ), (50)
R˜2 ≥ H(U2|U1, Y ), (51)
R˜1 + R˜2 ≥ H(U1, U2|Y ). (52)
Using (49) and [23, Lemma 1], which is a variation on the Slepian-Wolf source coding theorem,
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we have, for all S ∈ S,
lim
n→∞
EB
(
V
(
P˜W[1:2]F[1:2]U[1:2]YZSUˆ[1:2] , P˜W[1:2]F[1:2]U[1:2]YZS1{Uˆ[1:2] = U[1:2]}
))
= lim
n→∞
EB
(
PP˜ (Uˆ[1:2] 6= U[1:2])
)
= 0. (53)
Next, we use Lemma 2 to establish the secrecy condition for the source model in protocol
A. In Lemma 2, for j = 1, 2, set Xj = Uj , W˜j = 2
nRj , F˜j = 2
nR˜j , ZS = ZS , for all S ∈ S,
where Uj , S,ZS are defined as in protocol A. In addition, let D
S
j ,D
S
γj
, and DSγij be defined as
in (37)-(39), with Xj = Uj and ZS = ZS .
For S ∈ S, define Sj , {k : (k, j) ∈ S}. That is, Sj is the set of positions in which
the wiretapper observes the jth transmitter’s symbols. For j = 1, 2, let |Sj| = µj , and hence
µ1 + µ2 = µ. Thus, we have
H(U1|ZS) = H(U1|X1,S1 ,X2,S2) = H(U1,S1 ,U1,Sc1|X1,S1 ,X2,S2) (54)
= H(U1,S1 |X1,S1,X2,S2) +H(U1,Sc1 |X1,S1 ,X2,S2 ,U1,S1) (55)
= H(U1,S1 |X1,S1) +H(U1,Sc1) = µ1H(U1|X1) + (n− µ1)H(U1) (56)
H(U2|ZS) = µ2H(U2|X2) + (n− µ2)H(U2) (57)
H(U1|U2,ZS) = H(U1|U2,X1,S1 ,X2,S2) = H(U1,S1 ,U1,Sc1 |U2,X1,S1 ,X2,S2) (58)
= H(U1,S1 |U2,X1,S1 ,X2,S2) +H(U1,Sc1 |U2,X1,S1 ,X2,S2 ,U1,S1) (59)
= H(U1,S1 |X1,S1) +H(U1,Sc1) = µ1H(U1|X1) + (n− µ1)H(U1) (60)
H(U2|U1,ZS) = µ2H(U2|X2) + (n− µ2)H(U2), (61)
where (56) follows since {U1,S1,X1,S1} are independent from X2,S2 , and U1,Sc1 is independent
from {X1,S1 ,X2,S2 ,U1,S1}, since U1 is an i.i.d. sequence and pX1|U1 is a discrete memoryless
channel. Similarly, (60) follows since {U1,S1 ,X1,S1} are independent from {U2,X2,S2}, and
U1,Sc1 is independent from {U2,X1,S1 ,X2,S2 ,U1,S1}.
In addition, for the tuples (x[1,2], z) with pXj |ZS(xj |z) > 0 and pXi|XjZS(xi|xj, z) > 0, where
i, j = 1, 2, i 6= j, we have, for all S ∈ S, that
pUj |ZS(uj |z) = p(uj,Sj ,uj,Scj |xj,Sj ,xi,Si) = p(uj,Sj |xj,Sj ,xi,Si) p(uj,S
c
j
|uj,Sj ,xj,Sj ,xi,Si)
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= p(uj,Sj |xj,Sj ) p(uj,Scj ) =
∏
k∈Sj
p(uj,k|xj,k)
∏
k∈S
c
j
p(uj,k), (62)
pUi|UjZS(ui|uj, z) = p(ui,Si |xi,Si) p(ui,Sci ) =
∏
k∈Si
p(ui,k|xi,k)
∏
k∈S
c
i
p(ui,k). (63)
For i, j = 1, 2, i 6= j, and ǫ˜j > 0, let
γj = (1− ǫ˜j) min
S∈S
H(Uj|ZS) = (1− ǫ˜j)[µH(Uj|Xj) + (n− µ)H(Uj)], (64)
γij = (1− ǫ˜j) min
S∈S
H(Ui|Uj,ZS) = (1− ǫ˜j)[µH(Ui|Xi) + (n− µ)H(Ui)], (65)
where (64) and (65) follow from (56), (57), (60), (61), and the fact that µjH(Uj |Xj) + (n −
µj)H(Uj) is minimized by µj = µ, which occurs when S = {(k, j) : k ∈ Sp}, i.e., when the
wiretapper observes the symbols of the jth transmitter in all the positions she chooses.
Using Hoeffding inequality and the definition of DSγj in (38), we have, for all S ∈ S,
PpUjZS
(
(Uj ,ZS) /∈ D
S
γj
)
= PpUjZS
(
log
1
pUj |ZS(Uj|ZS)
≤ γj
)
(66)
= PpUjZS

∑
k∈Sj
log
1
p(Uj,k|Xj,k)
+
∑
k∈S
c
j
log
1
p(Uj,k)
≤ (1− ǫ˜j)[µH(Uj|Xj) + (n− µ)H(Uj)]


(67)
≤ PpUjZS

∑
k∈Sj
log
1
p(Uj,k|Xj,k)
+
∑
k∈S
c
j
log
1
p(Uj,k)
≤ (1− ǫ˜j)[µjH(Uj|Xj) + (n− µj)H(Uj)]


(68)
≤ exp(−β˜jn), (69)
where β˜j > 0 for j = 1, 2, and (68) follows because, for all S ∈ S,
µH(Uj|Xj) + (n− µ)H(Uj) ≤ µjH(Uj|Xj) + (n− µj)H(Uj). (70)
Note that, for any finite γj , in order to compute the probability on the left hand side of (66),
we only need to consider the tuples (uj , z) with pUj |ZS(uj |z) > 0.
Similarly, for i, j = 1, 2, i 6= j and all S ∈ S, using Hoeffding’s inequality, (63), (65), and the
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definition for DSγij in (39), we have
PpU[1:2]ZS
(
(U[1:2],ZS) /∈ D
S
γij
)
= PpU[1:2]ZS
(
log
1
pUi|UjZS(Ui|Uj,ZS)
≤ γij
)
≤ exp(−β˜in).
(71)
Taking δ2 = 2 exp(−β˜n), where β˜ = min{β˜1, β˜2}, yields
PpU[1:2]ZS
(
(U[1:2],ZS) 6∈ D
S
j
)
≤ δ2, (72)
for j = 1, 2 and all S ∈ S. Note that lim
n→∞
δ2 = 0, and hence, for n sufficiently large, δ2 ∈ (0, 1
4
).
Thus, the conditions for Lemma 2 are satisfied. We also have, for j = 1, 2, that
lim
n→∞
(δ + δ2) log(W˜jF˜j) = lim
n→∞
n(Rj + R˜j)(2 exp(−β˜n) + 4 exp(−2β˜n)) = 0 (73)
lim
n→∞
Hb(δ
2) = Hb
(
lim
n→∞
δ2
)
= 0, (74)
where (74) follows because Hb is a continuous function. Thus, we have
lim
n→∞
ǫ˜ = ǫ+ lim
n→∞
(δ + δ2) log(W˜jF˜j) + lim
n→∞
Hb(δ
2) = ǫ. (75)
By substituting the choices for W˜j , F˜j, γj, γij , where i, j = 1, 2, i 6= j, and
|S||Zn| ≤ exp(n[(1 + α) ln 2 + ln(|X1|+ |X2|+ 1)]), (76)
in (41), and using (75), we have, for every ǫ, ǫ′ > 0, ǫ˜ = ǫ+ ǫ′, there exist n∗ ∈ N and κǫ, κ˜ > 0
such that for all n ≥ n∗,
PB
(
max
S∈S
D
(
P˜W[1:2]F[1:2]ZS ||p
U
W[1:2]
pUF[1:2]pZS
)
≥ 2ǫ˜
)
≤ exp
(
−κǫe
κ˜n
)
, (77)
as long as
R1 + R˜1 ≤ (1− ǫ˜1) [αH(U1|X1) + (1− α)H(U1)], (78)
R2 + R˜2 ≤ (1− ǫ˜2) [αH(U2|X2) + (1− α)H(U2)]. (79)
By applying the first Borel-Cantelli Lemma to (77), we get
lim
n→∞
PB
(
max
S∈S
D
(
P˜W[1:2]F[1:2]ZS ||p
U
W[1:2]
pUF[1:2]pZS
)
> 0
)
= 0. (80)
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In addition, using Markov’s inequality and (47), we have, for any r > 0, that
∞∑
n=1
PB
(
V
(
P˜W[1:2]F[1:2], p
U
W[1:2]
pUF[1:2]
)
> r
)
≤
4
r
∞∑
n=1
exp(−βn) <∞. (81)
Using the first Borel-Cantelli lemma, it follows from (81) that
lim
n→∞
PB
(
V
(
P˜W[1:2]F[1:2], p
U
W[1:2]
pUF[1:2]
)
> 0
)
= 0. (82)
Remark 8 In the secrecy condition for the source model, (80), we require the independence
of the public messages F[1:2] from the confidential keys W[1:2] and the wiretapper’s observation
ZS . The reason is that, after showing that the secrecy condition in (80) holds as well for the
channel model in protocol B, we need to eliminate the common randomness F[1:2] from the
channel model by conditioning on a certain instance of it, without distributing the established
independence between the messages W[1:2] and the wiretapper’s observation ZS .
Now, we show that the reliability and secrecy conditions in (53) and (80) hold as well for the
channel model in protocol B. First, for the reliability condition, using (28), (30), and the triangle
inequality, we have
V
(
PW[1:2]F[1:2]U[1:2]YZSUˆ[1:2] , PW[1:2]F[1:2]U[1:2]YZS1{Uˆ[1:2] = U[1:2]}
)
≤ V
(
PW[1:2]F[1:2]U[1:2]YZSUˆ[1:2] , P˜W[1:2]F[1:2]U[1:2]YZSUˆ[1:2]
)
+ V
(
P˜W[1:2]F[1:2]U[1:2]YZSUˆ[1:2] , P˜W[1:2]F[1:2]U[1:2]YZS1{Uˆ[1:2] = U[1:2]}
)
+ V
(
P˜W[1:2]F[1:2]U[1:2]YZS1{Uˆ[1:2] = U[1:2]}, PW[1:2]F[1:2]U[1:2]YZS1{Uˆ[1:2] = U[1:2]}
)
(83)
= V
(
P˜W[1:2]F[1:2]U[1:2]YZSUˆ[1:2] , P˜W[1:2]F[1:2]U[1:2]YZS1{Uˆ[1:2] = U[1:2]}
)
+ 2V
(
PW[1:2]F[1:2], p
U
W[1:2]
pUF[1:2]
)
. (84)
Thus, using (47), (53), and (84), we have
lim
n→∞
EB
(
V
(
PW[1:2]F[1:2]U[1:2]YZSUˆ[1:2] , PW[1:2]F[1:2]U[1:2]YZS1{Uˆ[1:2] = U[1:2]}
))
= 0. (85)
Second, for the secrecy condition, using the union bound, we have
PB
(
max
S∈S
D
(
PW[1:2]F[1:2]ZS ||p
U
W[1:2]
pUF[1:2]pZS
)
> 0
)
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≤ PB
(
max
S∈S
D
(
P˜W[1:2]F[1:2]ZS ||p
U
W[1:2]
pUF[1:2]pZS
)
> 0
)
+ PB
(
V
(
P˜W[1:2]F[1:2] , p
U
W[1:2]
pUF[1:2]
)
> 0
)
.
(86)
Thus, using (80), (82), and (86), we have
lim
n→∞
PB
(
max
S∈S
D
(
PW[1:2]F[1:2]ZS ||p
U
W[1:2]
pUF[1:2]pZS
)
> 0
)
= 0. (87)
By applying the selection lemma to (85) and (87), there is at least one binning realization
b∗ = {b
∗(j)
1 , b
∗(j)
2 : j = 1, 2}, with a corresponding joint distribution p
∗ for protocol B such that
lim
n→∞
V
(
p∗
W[1:2]F[1:2]U[1:2]YZSUˆ[1:2]
, p∗W[1:2]F[1:2]U[1:2]YZS1{Uˆ[1:2] = U[1:2]}
)
= 0, (88)
and lim
n→∞
1
{
max
S∈S
D
(
p∗W[1:2]F[1:2]ZS ||p
U
W[1:2]
pUF[1:2]pZS
)
> 0
}
= 0, (89)
where Wj = b
∗(j)
1 (Uj) and Fj = b
∗(j)
2 (Uj), j = 1, 2.
Next, we introduce the Wˆ variables to the joint distributions in (88). For j = 1, 2, Wˆj is a deter-
ministic function of the random sequence Uˆj . In particular, p
∗
Wˆj |Uˆj
(wˆj|uˆj) = 1
{
wˆj = b
∗(j)
1 (uˆ)
}
.
Using (88) and a similar analysis as in [12, (58)-(64)], we have
lim
n→∞
EF[1:2]
(
Pp∗
(
Wˆ[1:2] 6= W[1:2]|F[1:2]
))
= lim
n→∞
V
(
p∗
W[1:2]F[1:2]U[1:2]YZSUˆ[1:2]
, p∗W[1:2]F[1:2]U[1:2]YZS1{Uˆ[1:2] = U[1:2]}
)
= 0. (90)
Using the union bound, we also have
PF[1:2]
(
max
S∈S
D
(
p∗W[1:2]ZS |F[1:2]||p
U
W[1:2]
p∗
ZS |F[1:2]
)
> 0
)
= P
(
max
S∈S
D(p∗W[1:2]ZS |F[1:2]||p
U
W[1:2]
p∗
ZS |F[1:2]
) > 0, and ∀S, p∗W[1:2]F[1:2]ZS = p
U
W[1:2]
pUF[1:2]pZS
)
+ 1
{
max
S∈S
D
(
p∗W[1:2]F[1:2]ZS ||p
U
W[1:2]
pUF[1:2]pZS
)
> 0
}
(91)
= 1
{
max
S∈S
D
(
p∗W[1:2]F[1:2]ZS ||p
U
W[1:2]
pUF[1:2]pZS
)
> 0
}
, (92)
where (92) follows since the first term on the right hand side of (91) is equal to zero. Thus,
using (89) and (92), we have
lim
n→∞
PF[1:2]
(
max
S∈S
D
(
p∗W[1:2]ZS |F[1:2]||p
U
W[1:2]
p∗
ZS |F[1:2]
)
> 0
)
= 0 (93)
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Once again, applying the selection lemma to (90) and (93), implies that there is at least one
realization f ∗[1:2] such that
lim
n→∞
P
(
Wˆ[1:2] 6= W[1:2]|F[1:2] = f
∗
[1:2]
)
= 0, (94)
lim
n→∞
max
S∈S
I
(
W[1:2];ZS|F[1:2] = f
∗
[1:2]
)
= 0. (95)
Let p˜∗ be the induced joint distribution for protocol A which corresponds to the binning realiza-
tion b∗. We identify
{
p˜∗(uj |wj, f
∗
j ), p(xj|uj), j = 1, 2
}
and
{
p˜∗(uˆ[1:2]|y, f
∗
[1:2]), {b
∗(j)
1 (uˆj), j = 1, 2}
}
as the encoders and the decoder for the original channel model.
By combining the rate conditions in (45), (46), (50)-(52), (78), and (79), and taking ǫ˜1, ǫ˜2 → 0,
we obtain the achievable strong secrecy rate region in (10)-(12). The convex hull follows by
time sharing independent codes and the fact that maximizing the secrecy constraint over S in
the whole block-length is upper bounded by its maximization over the individual segments of
the time sharing.
V. PROOFS FOR THEOREMS 2 AND 3
The proof for Theorem 2 follows similar steps as in the proof for Theorem 1. The difference
is that S and ZS , for all S ∈ S, in protocol A are defined as in (4), (5). We thus have, for
i, j = 1, 2, i 6= j, and all S ∈ S, that
H(Uj|ZS) = H(Uj,S,Uj,Sc|X1,S +X2,S) (96)
= H(Uj,S|X1,S +X2,S) +H(Uj,Sc|Uj,S,X1,S +X2,S) (97)
= H(Uj,S|X1,S +X2,S) +H(Uj,Sc) (98)
= µH(Uj|X1 +X2) + (n− µ)H(Uj) (99)
H(Ui|Uj,ZS) = H(Ui,S,Ui,Sc|Uj ,X1,S +X2,S) (100)
= H(Ui,S|Uj ,X1,S +X2,S) +H(Ui,Sc|Ui,S,Uj ,X1,S +X2,S) (101)
= H(Ui,S|Uj,S,X1,S +X2,S) +H(Ui,Sc) (102)
= µH(Ui|Uj, X1 +X2) + (n− µ)H(Ui). (103)
Thus, in applying Lemma 2 to the source model in protocol A, for i, j = 1, 2, i 6= j, and
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ǫ˜j > 0, we choose
γj = (1− ǫ˜j)min
S∈S
H(Uj|ZS) = (1− ǫ˜j)[µH(Uj|X1 +X2) + (n− µ)H(Uj)] (104)
γij = (1− ǫ˜j)min
S∈S
H(Ui|Uj ,ZS) = (1− ǫ˜j)[µH(Ui|Uj, X1 +X2) + (n− µ)H(Ui)]. (105)
Using Hoeffding inequality, the conditions of the lemma are satisfied, and the rate conditions
required for the secrecy property in (80) are
R1 + R˜1 ≤ αH(U1|X1 +X2) + (1− α)H(U1) (106)
R2 + R˜2 ≤ αH(U2|X1 +X2) + (1− α)H(U2) (107)
R1 +R2 + R˜1 + R˜2 ≤ αH(U[1:2]|X1 +X2) + (1− α)H(U[1:2]). (108)
These conditions, combined with the rate conditions for the Slepian-Wolf decoder, which are
R˜1 ≥ H(U1|U2, Y ), R˜2 ≥ H(U2|U1, Y ), (109)
R˜1 + R˜2 ≥ H(U[1:2]|Y ), (110)
and using time sharing, establish the achievability for the strong secrecy rate region in Theorem
2.
Remark 9 By setting j = 1, i = 2, instead of the minimum in the right hand side of (41),
Lemma 2 results in the maximum binning rate R1+ R˜1 of the source U1, and the corresponding
maximum conditional binning rate R2 + R˜2 for the source U2 given R1 + R˜1, such that the
probability in the left hand side of (41) is vanishing. In other words, Lemma 2 provides the
corner points of the binning rate region such that the probability, over the random binning
of the sources, that the bins are independent, uniform, and independent from the wiretapper’s
observation, is vanishing.
Similarly, the proof for Theorem 3 follows similar steps as in the proof for Theorem 1.
In protocol A, S and ZS for all S ∈ S are defined as in (7) in Section II-B. The sequences
U1,U2 are i.i.d. and the channel pV |U[1:2] is a discrete memoryless channel, since it results from
concatenating the two discrete memoryless channels pV |X[1:2] and pX[1:2]|U[1:2] . Thus, we have, for
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i, j = 1, 2, i 6= j, and all S ∈ S,
H(Uj|ZS) = H(Uj,S,Uj,Sc|X1,S,X2,S,VSc) (111)
= H(Uj,S|X1,S,X2,S,VSc) +H(Uj,Sc|Uj,S,X1,S,X2,S,VSc) (112)
= H(Uj,S|Xj,S) +H(Uj,Sc|VSc) (113)
= µH(Uj|Xj) + (n− µ)H(Uj|V ) (114)
H(Ui|Uj,ZS) = H(Ui,S,Ui,Sc|Uj ,X1,S,X2,S,VSc) (115)
= H(Ui,S|Uj ,X1,S,X2,S,VSc) +H(Ui,Sc|Ui,S,Uj,S,Uj,Sc,X1,S,X2,S,VSc) (116)
= H(Ui,S|Xi,S) +H(Ui,Sc|Uj,Sc,VSc) (117)
= µH(Ui|Xi) + (n− µ)H(Ui|Uj , V ), (118)
where (113) follows due to the Markov chainsUj,S−Xj,S−(Xi,S,VSc) and (Uj,S,X1,S,X2,S)−
VSc−Uj,Sc . Equation (117) follows from the Markov chains Ui,S−Xi,S− (Uj ,Xj,S,VSc) and
(Ui,S,Uj,S,X1,S,X2,S)− (Uj,Sc ,VSc)−Ui,Sc . These Markov chains follow since the sequences
U1,U2 are i.i.d. and the channels pX1|U1, pX2|U2, pV |U[1:2] are discrete memoryless.
Thus, for i, j = 1, 2, i 6= j, and ǫ˜j > 0, by choosing
γj = (1− ǫ˜j)min
S∈S
H(Uj |ZS) = (1− ǫ˜j)[µH(Uj|Xj) + (n− µ)H(Uj|V )] (119)
γij = (1− ǫ˜j)min
S∈S
H(Ui|Uj ,ZS) = (1− ǫ˜j)[µH(Ui|Xi) + (n− µ)H(Ui|Uj, V )], (120)
and using Hoeffding inequality, the conditions of Lemma 2 are satisfied. The rate conditions
needed for the secrecy property in (80) are
R1 + R˜1 ≤ αH(U1|X1) + (1− α)H(U1|V ) (121)
R2 + R˜2 ≤ αH(U2|X2) + (1− α)H(U2|V ) (122)
R1 +R2 + R˜1 + R˜2 ≤ αH(U[1:2]|X[1:2]) + (1− α)H(U[1:2]|V ). (123)
Combining (121)-(123) with the rate conditions required for the Slepian-Wolf decoder in (109)
and (110), and using time sharing, establish the achievability for the strong secrecy rate region
in Theorem 3.
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VI. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have studied the extension of the wiretap channel II with a noisy main channel
in [10] and the generalized wiretap channel model in [12] to the multiple access setting. For the
multiple access wiretap channel II with a noisy main channel, we have proposed three attack
models for the wiretapper and derived an achievable strong secrecy rate region for each. We have
generalized the strongest attack model, in which the wiretapper observes the transmitted symbols
of both users in the positions of the subset she chooses, to the case when the wiretapper observes
the outputs of a noisy multiple access channel instead of erasures outside this subset, proposing
a generalized multiple access wiretap model. We have derived an achievable strong secrecy rate
region for this generalized model. This model generalizes the multiple access wiretap channel
in [15], [16] as well to the case when the wiretapper is provided with noiseless observations
for a subset, of her choice, of the transmitted codeword symbols of both uses. The tools we
have utilized for achievability extend the set of tools utilized for the single-user scenario in
[12] to a multi-user setting. Future work includes other multi-terminal setups with more capable
wiretappers.
APPENDIX
First, we rewrite the relative entropy in (41) as follows:
D
(
PW[1:2]F[1:2]ZS ||p
U
W[1:2]
pUF[1:2]pZS
)
=
∑
w[1:2],f[1:2],z
PW[1:2]F[1:2]ZS(w[1:2], f[1:2], z) log
PW[1:2]F[1:2]ZS(w[1:2], f[1:2], z)
pUW[1:2]p
U
F[1:2]
pZS(z)
(124)
=
∑
w[1:2],f[1:2],z
PW[1:2]F[1:2]ZS(w[1:2], f[1:2], z) log
(
PW[1:2]F[1:2]ZS(w[1:2], f[1:2], z)
PW1F1ZS(w1, f1, z)p
U
W2
pUF2
.
PW1F1ZS(w1, f1, z)
pUW1p
U
F1
pZS(z)
)
(125)
= EpZS
(
D
(
PW[1:2]F[1:2]|ZS ||PW1F1|ZSp
U
W2
pUF2
))
+ D
(
PW1F1ZS ||p
U
W1
pUF1pZS
)
. (126)
Thus, the probability in (41) is upper bounded as
PB
(
max
S∈S
D
(
PW[1:2]F[1:2]ZS ||p
U
W[1:2]
pUF[1:2]pZS
)
≥ 2ǫ˜
)
≤ PB
(
max
S∈S
D
(
PW1F1ZS ||p
U
W1
pUF1pZS
)
> ǫ˜
)
+ PB
(
max
S∈S
EpZS
D
(
PW[1:2]F[1:2]|ZS ||PW1F1|ZSp
U
W2
pUF2
)
> ǫ˜
)
. (127)
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We upper bound each term on the right hand side of (127). Using [12, Lemma 2], the first
term is upper bounded as
PB
(
max
S∈S
D
(
PW1F1ZS ||p
U
W1
pUF1pZS
)
> ǫ˜
)
≤ |S||Z| exp
(
−ǫ2(1− δ)2γ1
3W˜1F˜1
)
. (128)
Next, we upper bound the second term in (127). For all S ∈ S, let us define
AS ,
{
z ∈ Z : PpX[1:2]|ZS
(
(X[1:2], z) ∈ D
S
1
)
≥ 1− δ
}
, (129)
where DS1 is defined in (37). We have
PpZS
(AcS) = PpZS
(
PpX[1:2]|ZS
(
(X[1:2], z) /∈ D
S
1
)
≥ δ
)
(130)
≤
1
δ
EpZS
(
PpX[1:2]|ZS
(
(X[1:2], z) /∈ D
S
1
))
(131)
=
1
δ
PpX[1:2]ZS
(
(X[1:2], ZS) /∈ D
S
1
)
(132)
≤
δ2
δ
= δ. (133)
where (131) follows from Markov’s inequality, and the inequality in (133) follows from (40).
For all w[1:2], f[1:2] ∈ [1 : W˜ ]× [1 : F˜ ] , z ∈ Z, and S ∈ S, define
P S1 (w[1:2], f[1:2]|z) =
∑
x[1:2]∈X1×X2
pX[1:2]|ZS(x[1:2]|z)1
{
(x[1:2], z) ∈ D
S
1
}
× 1
{
B
(j)
1 (xj) = wj,B
(j)
2 (xj) = fj, ∀j = 1, 2
}
(134)
P S2 (w[1:2], f[1:2]|z) =
∑
x[1:2]∈X1×X2
pX[1:2]|ZS (x[1:2]|z)1
{
(x[1:2], z) /∈ D
S
1
}
× 1
{
B
(j)
1 (xj) = wj,B
(j)
2 (xj) = fj, ∀j = 1, 2
}
. (135)
Thus, we have PW[1:2]F[1:2]|ZS(w[1:2], f[1:2]|z) = P
S
1 (w[1:2], f[1:2]|z) + P
S
2 (w[1:2], f[1:2]|z).
Now, for every x2 ∈ X2, define
Ux2 =
∑
x1∈X1
pX[1:2]|ZS(x[1:2]|z)1
{
B
(2)
1 (x2) = w2,B
(2)
2 (x2) = f2
}
1
{
(x[1:2], z) ∈ D
S
1
}
. (136)
The random variables {Ux2}x2∈X2 are non-negative and independent since the random variables{
B
(2)
1 (x2),B
(2)
2 (x2)
}
x2∈X2
are independent. From the definition of DS1 in (37), we have for
(x[1:2], z) ∈ D
S
1 that (x[1:2], z) ∈ D
S
γ21
. Additionally, from the definition of Dγ21 in (39), we have
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that p(x2|x1, z) ≤ 2
−γ21 . From (136), we have
Ux2 ≤
∑
x1
pX1|ZS(x1|z)pX2|X1,ZS(x2|x1, z)1
{
(x[1:2], z) ∈ D
S
1
}
(137)
≤ 2−γ21
∑
x1
pX1|ZS(x1|z)1
{
(x[1:2], z) ∈ D
S
1
}
(138)
≤ 2−γ21 . (139)
Since for all x2 ∈ X2,
EB
(
1
{
B
(2)
1 (x2) = w2,B
(2)
2 (x2) = f2
})
=
1
W˜2F˜2
, (140)
we have,
∑
x2∈X2
EB(Ux2) =
1
W˜2F˜2
∑
x[1:2]∈X1×X2
pX[1:2]|ZS(x[1:2]|z)1
{
(x[1:2], z) ∈ D
S
1
}
(141)
=
PpX[1:2]|ZS
((
X[1:2], z
)
∈ DS1
)
W˜2F˜2
. (142)
In addition, notice that
∑
w1,f1
P S1 (w[1:2], f[1:2]|z) =
∑
x[1:2]
pX[1:2]|ZS(x[1:2]|z)1
{(
x[1:2], z
)
∈ DS1
}
×
∑
w1,f1
1
{
B
(j)
1 (xj) = wj,B
(j)
2 (xj) = fj , ∀j = 1, 2
}
(143)
=
∑
x2
∑
x1
pX[1:2]|ZS(x[1:2]|z)1
{
B
(2)
1 (x2) = w2,B
(2)
2 (x2) = f2
}
1
{(
x[1:2], z
)
∈ DS1
}
(144)
=
∑
x2
Ux2 (145)
We now state the following lemma, which is a variation on Chernoff’s bound that we need
to utilize in the proof.
Lemma 3 (A variation on Chernoff bound [12, Lemma 6]): Let U1, U2, · · · , Un be a sequence
of non-negative independent random variables with respective means E(Ui) = m¯i. If Ui ∈ [0, b],
for all i ∈ [1 : n], and
∑n
i=1 m¯i ≤ m¯, then, for every ǫ ∈ [0, 1], we have
P
(
n∑
i=1
Ui ≥ (1 + ǫ)m¯
)
≤ exp
(
−ǫ2
m¯
3b
)
. (146)
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The random variables {Ux2}x2∈X2 are non-negative, independent, and Ux2 ∈ [0, 2
−γ21 ] for all
x2 ∈ X2. By applying Lemma 3 to the random variables {Ux2}x2∈X2 , we have,
PB
(
P S1 (w[1:2], f[1:2]|z) ≥
1 + ǫ
W˜2F˜2
PW1F1|ZS(w1, f1|z)
)
≤ PB
(∑
w1,f1
P S1 (w[1:2], f[1:2]|z) ≥
1 + ǫ
W˜2F˜2
∑
w1,f1
PW1F1|ZS(w1, f1|z)
)
(147)
= P
(∑
x2
Ux2 ≥
1 + ǫ
W˜2F˜2
)
(148)
≤ P
(∑
x2
Ux2 ≥
1 + ǫ
W˜2F˜2
PpX[1:2]|ZS
((
X[1:2], z
)
∈ DS1
))
(149)
= P
(∑
x2
Ux2 ≥ (1 + ǫ)
∑
x2
EB(Ux2)
)
(150)
≤ exp
(
−ǫ22γ21
3W˜2F˜2
PpX[1:2]|ZS
((
X[1:2], z
)
∈ DS1
))
. (151)
where (148) follows from (145), (150) follows from (142), and (151) follows from Lemma 3.
From the definition ofAS in (129), we have, for all z ∈ AS , that PpX[1:2]|ZS
((
X[1:2], z
)
∈ DS1
)
≥
1− δ. Thus, for all z ∈ AS ,
PB
(
P S1 (w[1:2], f[1:2]|z) ≥
1 + ǫ
W˜2F˜2
PW1F1|ZS(w1, f1|z)
)
≤ exp
(
−ǫ2(1− δ)2γ21
3W˜2F˜2
)
. (152)
Note that, for fixed z ∈ Z and S ∈ S, the random variables
{
P S1 (w[1:2], f[1:2]|z)
}
are identically
distributed for all w[1:2], f[1:2] due to the symmetry in the random binning. Let b , {b
(j)
1 , b
(j)
2 , j =
1, 2} be a realization of the random binning B. We define the class G of binning functions b as
G ,
{
b : P S1 (w[1:2], f[1:2]|z) <
1 + ǫ
W˜2F˜2
PW1F1|ZS(w1, f1|z), for all S ∈ S and z ∈ AS
}
. (153)
Using the union bound, we have
PB(G
c) = PB
(
P S1 (w[1:2], f[1:2]|z) ≥
1 + ǫ
W˜2F˜2
PW1F1|ZS(w1, f1|z), for some S ∈ S or z ∈ AS
)
(154)
≤
∑
S∈S,z∈AS
PB
(
P S1 (w[1:2], f[1:2]|z) ≥
1 + ǫ
W˜2F˜2
PW1F1|ZS(w1, f1|z)
)
(155)
≤
∑
S∈S
|AS| exp
(
−ǫ2(1− δ)2γ21
3W˜2F˜2
)
(156)
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≤ |S||Z| exp
(
−ǫ2(1− δ)2γ21
3W˜2F˜2
)
, (157)
where (156) follows from (152).
Take b such that b ∈ G, and set Wj = b
(j)
1 (Xj) and Fj = b
(j)
2 (Xj) for j = 1, 2. For all S ∈ S,
we have
EpZS
(
D
(
PW[1:2]F[1:2]|ZS ||PW1F1|ZSp
U
W2
pUF2
))
= EpZS

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w[1:2],f[1:2]
PW[1:2]F[1:2]|ZS(w[1:2], f[1:2]|ZS) log
PW[1:2]F[1:2]|ZS(w[1:2], f[1:2]|ZS)
PW1F1|ZS(w1, f1|ZS)p
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pUF2

 (158)
= EpZS


∑
w[1:2],f[1:2]
2∑
i=1
P Si (w[1:2], f[1:2]|ZS) log
∑2
i=1 P
S
i (w[1:2], f[1:2]|ZS)
PW1F1|ZS
(w1,f1|ZS)
W˜2F˜2
2∑
i=1
∑
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

(159)
≤ EpZS
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(160)
= EpZS

 2∑
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P Si (w[1:2], f[1:2]|ZS) log
1∑
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P Si (w[1:2], f[1:2]|ZS)
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+ EpZS

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S
1 (w[1:2], f[1:2]|ZS)
PW1F1|ZS(w1, f1|ZS)
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+ EpZS

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PW1F1|ZS(w1, f1|ZS)

 , (161)
where (160) follows from the log-sum inequality.
Now, we upper bound each term in the right hand side of (161) for b ∈ G. The second term
in the right hand side of (161) is upper bounded as follows:
EpZS

 ∑
w[1:2],f[1:2]
P S1 (w[1:2], f[1:2]|ZS) log
W˜2F˜2P
S
1 (w[1:2], f[1:2]|ZS)
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
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= EpZS

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
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+ EpZS

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≤ δ log(W˜2F˜2) + ǫ, (166)
where (163) follows because, for i = 1, 2,
P Si (w[1:2], f[1:2]|ZS) ≤ PW[1:2]F[1:2]|ZS(w[1:2], f[1:2]|ZS) (167)
= PW1F1|ZS(w1, f1|z)PW2F2|W1F1ZS(w2, f2|w1, f1, z) (168)
≤ PW1F1|ZS(w1, f1|z), (169)
and hence
PSi (w[1:2],f[1:2]|ZS)
PW1F1|ZS
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≤ 1 for all w[1:2], f[1:2] and i = 1, 2. Equation (164) follows because,
from (153), we have for all b ∈ G and z ∈ AS that
W˜2F˜2P
S
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Next, we upper bound the third term in the right hand side of (161). We have that
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where (172) follows from the assumption of the lemma in (40). Using (169) and (172), we have
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P S2
(
w[1:2], f[1:2]|ZS
)
= 1− PpX[1:2]|ZS
((
X[1:2], ZS
)
∈ DS1
)
, (177)
the first term on the right hand side of (161) is upper bounded as follows:
EpZS

 2∑
i=1
∑
w[1:2],f[1:2]
P Si (w[1:2], f[1:2]|ZS) log
1∑
w[1:2],f[1:2]
P Si (w[1:2], f[1:2]|ZS)


= EpZS
(
Hb
(
PpX[1:2]|ZS
((
X[1:2], ZS
)
∈ DS1
)))
(178)
≤ Hb
(
EpZS
(
PpX[1:2]|ZS
((
X[1:2], ZS
)
∈ DS1
)))
(179)
= Hb
(
PpX[1:2],ZS
((
X[1:2], ZS
)
∈ DS1
))
(180)
≤ Hb(1− δ
2) = Hb(δ
2), (181)
where (179) follows from Jensen’s inequality and the concavity of Hb, and (181) follows from
(40) and that Hb(x) is monotonically decreasing in x ∈ (
1
2
, 1).
Using (166), (174), and (181), for any b ∈ G and for all S ∈ S, the left hand side of (161) is
upper bounded as
EpZS
(
D
(
PW[1:2]F[1:2]|ZS ||PW1F1|ZSp
U
W2
pUF2
))
≤ ǫ+ (δ + δ2) log(W˜2F˜2) +Hb(δ
2) ≤ ǫ˜. (182)
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Thus, the second probability on the right hand side of (127) is upper bounded as
PB
(
max
S∈S
EpZS
D
(
PW[1:2]F[1:2]|ZS ||PW1F1|ZSp
U
W2
pUF2
)
> ǫ˜
)
= 1− PB
(
max
S∈S
EpZS
D
(
PW[1:2]F[1:2]|ZS ||PW1F1|ZSp
U
W2
pUF2
)
≤ ǫ˜
)
(183)
= 1− PB
(
EpZS
D
(
PW[1:2]F[1:2]|ZS ||PW1F1|ZSp
U
W2
pUF2
)
≤ ǫ˜ for all S ∈ S
)
(184)
≤ 1− PB(G) = PB(G
c) (185)
≤ |S||Z| exp
(
−ǫ2(1− δ)2γ21
3W˜2F˜2
)
, (186)
where (186) follows from (157).
Finally, by rewriting (126) with switching the roles of (W1, F1) and (W2, F2) and repeating
the whole proof, we obtain the second term in the minimum in (41), which completes the proof
for Lemma 2.
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